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The passage of the Care Bill 2013-14 through Parliament might make Jonathan Herring’s book particularly timely.  The book’s scope, however, stretches far beyond that of the Bill.  Its aim is to ‘provide a sounder theoretical basis and some practical recommendations for the promotion of a society and legal system which puts care at its heart’ (p. vii), and it brilliantly succeeds in a highly engaging manner.
Herring opens with a critique of a ‘national obsession’ with ‘the production of economic value’, which does not easily accommodate care (p. 1), and the fact that Law has historically been ‘arranged around the vision of an able, autonomous and unattached adult’ (p. 2).  His assertions that ‘[t]he law in all areas can be rewritten with caring as the underlying tenet’ and that ‘[m]oney and individual rights…are a sandy foundation, but caring is the rock on which society stands’ (p. 10) in the same introductory chapter strikingly set the tone for the rest of the book.
Chapter 2 necessarily aims to ‘provide an indication of the extent to which an activity is or is not care’ (p. 14).  Herring settles upon four markers of care, which he discusses in considerable depth, and does not limit the concept to (for example) informal care.  The markers are: meeting needs (in the light of his understandable anxiety that care be understood as an activity rather than a mere feeling), respect, responsibility and relationality.  Relationality is one of the dominant themes in the book.  Herring is adamant that the circumstances of each party to a caring relationship cannot be considered independently, and this caused him to reject the very title ‘Carers and the law’ and focus on relationships instead.  In his view, a relational approach helps to counter the ‘disability critique’ of care, which highlights the dangers of assuming that disability must be ‘remedied’ by care (p. 28), and to avoid the risk of glorifying the carer and denigrating the ‘cared-for’.  I could be accused of distinguishing too sharply between ‘carer’ and ‘care recipient’ in my own work (Sloan, 2013).  It is telling, however, that Herring is unable to avoid considerable specific discussion of ‘carers’ because of the current structure of much Law, literature and thought.
	The definitional question causes real difficulty in works on the law or policy of care, largely because of the basic tension between the desire to emphasise both that care is universal and that it raises particular issues for particular people.  Herring concedes that ‘[t]here is a danger in the approach [he] advocate[s] in that caring covers such a ‘multitude of sins’ that it loses all meaning!’, but seeks to circumvent the difficulty by suggesting that there ‘may be particular circumstances in which some caring relationships will require or deserve support and/or legal regulations and others that don’t’ (p. 26).
Chapter 3 then builds upon the previous chapter in the light of the fact that ‘[i]t is one of the aims of the book to give some practical applications of an ethic of care for law’ (p. 85).  Herring provides an excellent and extremely useful analysis of the vast theoretical literature on the topic.  He identifies the principles of an ethic of care as emphasising: that care is a part of being human and a good part of life; the ethical significance of emotions; the significance of intermingled interests; the importance of responsibilities rather than rights, and of non-abstraction and a focus on context and reality.  He deals well with points of dispute within, and criticisms of, the approach. In response to the claim that Law is fundamentally ill-suited to an ethic of care, Herring argues that  Law has an influence beyond the cases actually reaching court, that Law can control or require state intervention  to promote care and that it cannot always be assumed that the relationships of those ending up in court have ended.
	Chapter 4 critically considers the vexed question of state support for care in England, covering the reasons why care matters to the state; the basis and nature of state support; the defamilisation and commodification of care; the relevance of the work-life balance debate; benefits and services currently available to carers; and social care, its funding, its difficult relationship with healthcare and the limited role of the courts in overseeing it.  Herring closes the chapter with the powerful reminder that care (which he sees as a vital aspect of citizenship) inescapably carries costs, and that ‘[w]hen…it is said that it is “too expensive” for the state to cover these costs, we are accepting they should stay where they currently lie’ (p. 152).    
The next three chapters consider how numerous substantive legal fields do and should respond to caring relationships.  Inevitably, these are less detailed than they might have been had a less theoretical approach been taken, but the breadth of discussion is admirably ambitious and Herring’s account is notable for its focus on English Law.  The discussion begins with an argument for a more relational approach to various aspects of medical law.  Probably the most controversial assertion in chapter 5 is that ‘even an interference in the wishes of a person with capacity can be justified when the relational context is taken into account’ (p. 173), and Herring seems prepared to countenance the ordering of some medical procedures without the competent immediate patient’s consent on the basis of his carer’s best interests.  This would require a complete change of approach in a field understandably dominated by patient autonomy.
Herring makes four ‘radical claims’ on Family Law, albeit acknowledging that ‘[w]e have…begun to see a shift’ in the direction of his ‘claims’ ‘over the past decade or two’ (p. 187).  The first is that care rather than sex should be at the heart of Family Law, since sex per se is in fact irrelevant to its functions and provides no benefit to the state (cf. Sloan, 2013, chapter 6).  Herring then asserts that in reality care is now the predominant means of acquiring parenthood, making the intriguing argument that ‘[i]f the law really did think the biological link was important it would do DNA tests on…at least every child born where paternity was in issue’ (p. 200).  Herring claims that a preference for social parenthood does not ‘deny that children may have some kind of claim to be entitled to know of their genetic origins’ (200), though his suggestion that ‘we should give parental status and…rights in accordance with’ the welfare principle (p. 200) might carry a risk of social engineering.  He next makes the relatively familiar claim that the welfare principle governing disputes about a child’s upbringing should be understood in a relational sense, before arguing that care is and should be a central consideration in the context of relief on divorce.  There is clearly much force in that suggestion, although Glennon (2008, p. 40) has argued that ‘“[c]ontributions to the welfare of the family” have been removed as the central tenet of capital sharing and replaced by a principle which is based upon the fact of marriage as a partnership of equals’ (see further Sloan, 2013, p. 184).  
In chapter 7, ‘Caring and General Law’, Herring considers care in relation to three other substantive areas while not purporting to provide a ‘definitive guide’ (p. 234).  In relation to Human Rights Law, Herring considers local authorities’ positive obligations to facilitate and support caring relationships rather than just intervening. While discussing Tort Law, he argues that ‘the courts struggl[e] to fit caring into traditional forms of legal thought’ (p. 247).  Finally, Herring analyses the difficulties of combining work and care, and the uneven distribution of relevant Employment Law rights across different sorts of carers.  He points out that ‘[e]mployers succeed and operate in the society which functions only because of the performance of care work by employees generally and others’ (p. 256), but recognises that problems with care in this context reflect ‘broader social attitudes and practices’ relating to gender discrimination (p. 257).
The last substantive chapter in the book considers caring and abuse, reflecting the fact that it can be too easy to think that ‘caring is like crème brûlée’ in that ‘no one could possibly argue against it’ (p. 260).  Herring, however, suggests that abusive relationships are not protected by an ethic of care because they are not marked by respect and rationality.  In addressing the difficulties of defining abuse within intimate relationships, he ultimately focuses on ‘[h]armful acts in an intimate relationship’, ‘[a]cts perpetuating relational inequality’ and ‘[a]cts perpetuating societal disadvantage’ (p. 268).  Having questioned the dominance of ‘carer stress’ as an explanation of such abuse, he argues for a human right to be protected from it.  He criticises the criminal law’s approach to caring relationships, suggesting that care-related prosecutions should be extremely limited, and summarises relevant civil law protection before discussing compulsory state intervention to prevent abuse.  He also argues that the present regime for the prevention of abuse through regulation must be improved.
In his concluding chapter, Herring draws upon Nassbaum (2003)’s analysis of Sen’s capabilities approach to argue that ‘[t]he meeting of basic needs is essential if people are to have the capabilities to live as they wish’, and that ‘[s]upport and recognition for those caring for the needs of others is essential if they are to have the capabilities’ (p. 322).  Unsurprisingly, he declares emphatically that ‘Law, legal procedure and legal remedies should be designed with the aim of upholding, enabling, encouraging and maintaining caring relationships’ (p. 322).
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